This study examined the effects of individual, school-level and country-level variables and their interactions on two components of adolescents' active European citizenship: trust in European institutions and participation at the European level. For comparison, country-related institutional trust and participation were also predicted. Using multilevel regression models, we re-analysed a subsample of survey data from the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS), collected from 14-year-old students (n=72,466) in 22 European countries in 2009. Results showed that higher cognitive engagement with politics (e.g., political interest), more opportunities for learning about Europe at school, and country wealth and social equality were positively associated with both aspects of adolescents' active European citizenship. In contrast to country-related participation, the participatory dimension of active European citizenship was also positively related to a higher socioeconomic status of adolescent's classroom and family, an association that was more pronounced in less wealthy and post-communist countries.
schools or families, and (3) macro factors formed by the country-level characteristics (cf. Barrett, 2015) .
In the present study, we consider the effects of two broad individual factors. One of them is cognitive engagement with politics, understood as paying attention to and being interested in public affairs (Zukin et al., 2006) . Using both adolescent and adult samples, previous studies have shown positive links from political interest or following political news in the media to trust in institutions (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; Claes, Hooghe, & Marien, 2012; Šerek & Macek, 2014) or civic participation (Pasek, Kenski, Romer, & Jamieson, 2006; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995) . On the border between social and individual factors, positive associations have been also shown between political discussions with parents or peers and civic participation (McIntosh, Hart, & Youniss, 2007; Zukin et al., 2006) . The second individual factor is post-materialist value orientation, emphasizing autonomy and selfexpression, and manifesting itself, for instance, through the support for equal rights of different social groups. People with such values are expected to be more involved in noninstitutionalized civic participation (Theocharis, 2011) but to have rather critical and negative views of public institutions, hence a rather negative effect on trust can be expected (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006) .
Among social factors, we focus particularly on those related to school. First, there is a well-known link between open classroom climate, characterized by the possibility to engage in respectful debates and to freely express opinions, and students' higher political trust (Claes et al., 2012) or participatory tendencies (Campbell, 2008; Manganelli, Lucidi, & Alivernini, 2015; Quintelier & Hooghe, 2013) . Second, we expect that students' trust and participation, particularly at the European level, will be enhanced by opportunities for learning new information about European issues (cf. Claes, et al., 2012 , Torney-Purta, Barber, Richardson, 2004 . From the macro level perspective, we assume that citizens' institutional trust is eroded by worse living conditions in the country (cf. Torney-Purta, et al., 2004) or great social inequalities (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) . In a similar manner, poor economic conditions and social inequalities might pose a barrier to adolescents' participation (Solt, 2008) . Another country-level factor in the European context is a communist past of the country. Even though current adolescents do not have direct experiences with authoritarian communist regimes, certain tendencies such as distrust in public institutions might still be present in and passed on through political cultures of the post-communist countries (e.g., through political socialization by parents and teachers).
Finally, an important source of differences in adolescents' active citizenship is their status in the society, defined by their gender, socioeconomic situation, or migration background (cf. Verba et al., 1995) . For instance, willingness to participate is lower among young people coming from low status families (Gaby, 2016) or first-generation immigrant youth (Lopez & Marcelo, 2008) . At the same time, social and macro factors might moderate the consequences of social status on active citizenship. As noted above, adolescents' development is embedded in multiple contexts (cf. Bronfenbrenner, 1979) that interact with person's individual characteristics such as social status. Hence, due to person-by-context interactions, the impact of adolescents' individual status might have different forms and extents across contexts. For instance, although young people from immigrant or ethnic minority groups have generally lower rates of civic participation than native and majority youth, data from different European countries show that this pattern might be absent or even reversed for some groups in specific countries (Barrett & Zani, 2015) . Similarly, certain contextual characteristics of the classroom (e.g. open climate) are expected to mitigate the gaps in active citizenship stemming from students' socioeconomic background, although these moderation effects have not been convincingly demonstrated yet (Castillo, Miranda, Bonhomme, Cox, & Bascopé, 2015) .
The present study
Due to the lacking knowledge on the predictors of adolescents' active citizenship at European level, this study takes an exploratory approach employing the predictors that were previously described for the national level. The main goal is to assess individual, school/classroom and country-level predictors of European-level institutional trust and participation and to differentiate European from general active citizenship. At the same time, we aim to test whether potential effects of person's social status are moderated by higherlevel variables (i.e. person-by-context interaction). Overall, we assume that active European citizenship is predicted by similar variables as national active citizenship although the effects in the former case might be weaker due to supposed adolescents' less frequent and less direct experience with the European versus the national level. However, it may be that at least some factors are more predictive of national than of European level citizenship and vice versa.
Thus, it may be that migration background is negatively associated with national and positively with European citizenship, as previous studies have shown that ethnic minority members are more likely to identify with the EU, but are less likely to identify with their nation (Hadler, Tsutsui, & Chin, 2012) . This is presumably because the EU pressures member states to give more rights to ethnic minorities. Socioeconomic status may also relate more strongly to European than to national-level citizenship because social and economic elites gain the most from new opportunities arising from European integration (e.g., traveling freely, studying abroad; Hadler et al., 2012) . Post-materialist tendencies such as granting equal rights to different groups (e.g., to immigrants) should also be more strongly related to European level citizenship as the EU advocates and enforces policies meant to guarantee equal rights to different groups much more strongly than its member states. Lastly, opportunities for learning about Europe should most strongly be associated with European rather than with national citizenship.
To distinguish whether the effects established by our study are specific for European active citizenship, or whether they concern active citizenship in general, we will include both European and country-related trust and participation as outcome variables. In addition, we will control for county-level trust when predicting European level trust and for countryrelated participation when predicting European level participation.
Method

Participants and procedure
We reanalysed survey data from the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) conducted in 2009 in 38 countries across the world. Questionnaires were administered in schools to eighth-graders (50% females) who were on average 14 years old.
Only one classroom per school was sampled . For our analyses, we used a subset of 22 countries that were members of the European Union and where a module on issues relevant to Europe was administered. Data had a three-level structure: a total number of 72,466 students (level 1) were nested in 3,632 classrooms (level 2; mean classroom size was 19.62) that were nested in 22 countries (level 3). Due to occasional missing data, the final numbers of analysed participants differed slightly from analysis to analysis 1 .
Measures
If not stated otherwise, we used scales developed and provided by the authors of the ICCS. Using item response modelling, they computed the total scores of these scales from the items based on the weighted likelihood estimates (logits) of the latent dimensions. The scales were transformed to have an international average of 50 and a standard deviation of 10 (these values were slightly different in our study because we used a subsample of 22 countries). For more details see Schulz et al. (2011) . Country-level variables. Country's wealth was represented by its gross domestic product per capita (GDP) standardized according to the European Union average (Eurostat, 2009a; M=101.27, SD=41.56) . Income inequality was indicated by the GINI index (Eurostat, 2009b; M=0.29, SD=0.04) and gender inequality by the Gender Inequality Index (GII; UNDP, 2016; M=0.14, SD=0.06). Communist (=1; eight countries) or non-communist past (=0; 14 countries) was indicated by a dichotomous variable.
Data analysis
Data was analysed using multilevel linear regression models in Mplus 7.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998 -2015 . Sampling weights at levels 1 and 2 recommended by Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz, & Zuehlke (2011) were used.
For each outcome, several three-level models were estimated using the maximum likelihood estimator with robust standard errors (MLR (Aiken & West, 1991) . For specific values of the moderator, see Table A3 in Online Appendix.
Results
Preliminary analyses
Intercept-only models showed that the variance in outcome variables was attributable mostly to differences between individuals (see Notes in Tables 1-4) . Differences between classrooms were the most pronounced for European-level participation (10%), while differences between countries were the strongest for trust in country-related institutions (7%).
There was a strong correlation between trust in country-related and European institutions (r=.60) and a moderate correlation between community-level and European-level participation (r=.26; see Online Appendix A for the full correlation table and country-level descriptives).
Predictors of trust
Trust in country-related institutions. On the individual level, trust was not associated with gender, migration or socioeconomic background (M1 in Table 1 ). After other individual predictors were added, significant effects of seven predictors appeared (M2).
Standardized coefficients revealed that most of these effects were negligible except for the effects of political interest (β=.26) and opportunities for learning about Europe (β=.16). On the classroom level (M3), students in classrooms with a higher average socioeconomic background expressed a lower institutional trust (β=-.19). Finally, on the country level (M4a-d), institutional trust was higher in countries with a higher GDP (β=.56), smaller economic (β=-.55) and gender inequalities (β=-.45), and without communist past (β=-.55).
[ Trust in European institutions. On the individual level, trust was positively but only marginally predicted by male gender and socioeconomic background (M1 in Table 2 ).
After other individual predictors were added, all of them had significant effects (M2).
However, most of them were negligible except for the positive effects of political interest (β=.26) and opportunities for learning about Europe (β=.12). On the classroom level (M3), there was a significant but rather negligible (β=-.09) effect of opportunities for learning about Europe at school. Finally, trust was higher in countries with a higher GDP (β=.29) and smaller income (β=.36) or gender inequalities (β=-.46; M4a-d). Random slopes of sociodemographic predictors were not tested because their main effects were negligible.
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Predictors of participation
Participation in the wider community. On the individual level, there were positive effects of female gender and socioeconomic background, but both these effects were negligible (M1 in Table 3 ). After the addition of other individual variables, seven predictors were significant (M2). According to standardized coefficients, most of these effects were negligible except for the effects of political discussions (β=.18) and political interest (β=.12).
On the classroom level (M3), students from classrooms with a higher average socioeconomic background participated less in the wider community (β=-.14). On the country level (M4a-d),
participation was higher in countries with greater gender inequalities (β=.46).
[ [ 
Discussion
The aim of this study was to find out whether active European citizenship can be separated from general active citizenship by examining differences in predictors of institutional trust and civic participation at the national versus the European level. Our findings point out that it is possible to distinguish between general active citizenship and European citizenship on the participatory dimension but not on the psychological dimension of trust. More specifically, results indicate that the participatory dimension of EU citizenship depends to a large degree on socio-economic resources at the individual, school, and country level. In addition, findings point to the important role of adolescents' cognitive political engagement, and school opportunities for learning about Europe as predictors of active EU citizenship.
Distinguishing between national and European active citizenship
With regard to institutional trust, a comparison of the models predicting national versus European level trust revealed, with two exceptions, few differences in predictors. By far the biggest influence on trust in European institutions was trust in national institutions, which accounted for a large share of the variance. This suggests that once we can explain institutional trust, we can also explain trust in European institutions. Such a finding is insofar surprising because one could assume that in countries with a negative discourse towards the European Union (e.g., Greece) trust towards authorities of the nation state (e.g., government, courts, police) need not necessarily be related to trust in institutions at the European level. Of course, we need to take into account that 14-year-old adolescents may not be politically savvy enough yet to make clear distinctions between institutions at the national and the European level. Thus, future research should examine whether the distinction between national and European institutional trust is equally small among adults.
One exception to this pattern was that students in classrooms with higher than average levels of socio-economic background had lower trust in national institutions but, controlling for country-related institutional trust, higher trust in EU institutions. Notably, this tendency was present only in less wealthy, more unequal and post-communist countries. A possible explanation is that national institutions are generally less trustworthy in these countries and students from more educated backgrounds and privileged schools (e.g., higher track schools) are more aware of that fact. Consistent with this explanation, the distrust of these students was primarily oriented towards national but not European institutions, which were perceived relatively positively. The second exception was a finding that students in countries with a communist past expressed lower trust in national institutions but, controlling for their country-related trust, they expressed higher trust in European institutions. Again, it seems that adolescents living in post-communist countries trust in institutions less than their peers living in countries without a communist past but their distrust pertains to national rather than European institutions. A relatively more positive image of the European Union among young people from new (i.e. mostly post-communist) versus old member states has been already found by other studies (Eurobarometer, 2007) and it is probably associated with positive perceptions of the European Union enlargement in 2004 (Nancy, 2016) .
When comparing the models predicting participation at the national versus European level, results revealed more notable differences in predictors than in the models predicting trust. Thus, both socio-economic background and opportunities to learn about Europe were more strongly related to participation at the European level than at the national level, both at the individual and the classroom level. Importantly, controlling for participation at the where to find them. This may also explain why socio-economic resources at the individual, school-and country-level are so strongly related to participation at the European level.
The contributions of predictors at different levels of analysis
For all dimensions and levels of citizenship, at least five sixths of their variance was attributable to the individual level. It means that the differences between students in both national and European active citizenship were primarily given by individual-level factors. School-and country-level factors were not negligible, but their roles were less pronounced.
Results on individual psychological predictors showed that adolescents' active Next, lower levels of both components of active European citizenship were found in less wealthy countries and in countries with greater income or (in the case of trust) gender inequality. This is in agreement with the expectation that the contexts characterized by economic problems and social inequalities undermine young people's institutional trust and pose a barrier to their participation in cross-border activities (cf. Solt, 2008; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) . Consistent with this explanation, the same country-level factors were found to undermine country-related institutional trust, and, as suggested above, the negative perceptions of European institutions in less wealthy and more unequal countries were an expression of a general distrust in institutions rather than a distrust in European institutions as such. On the other hand, country-related participation in the wider community was only poorly explained by the examined country-level predictors, which suggests that a different set of factors plays a role here. Based on the indication that country-related participation was slightly higher in more unequal countries, one of these factors may be collective grievances (Walker & Smith, 2002) .
Regarding individual social status, no substantial differences in trust in European institutions were found between males and females, people with and without immigration background, or adolescents from different socioeconomic conditions. Also, no gender or immigration-based differences were present for European-level participation.
However, we found that adolescents coming from families with higher socioeconomic status, compared to those from low status families, tended to participate more in European activities. This effect interacted with country-level context and was specifically pronounced in less wealthy and post-communist countries. Moreover, the effect was present also at the school level, suggesting that European-level participation was limited in schools with higher proportions of socioeconomically disadvantaged students. Hence, poor socioeconomic conditions in multiple contexts seem to add up to limit adolescents' opportunities for meeting and cooperating with people from different European countries.
Consequently, participation in European-level activities is probably, to a large extent, facilitated by privileged socioeconomic conditions, in which an adolescent lives and studies.
On the contrary, the negative effects of individual and contextual socioeconomic conditions were not present for national active citizenship. Moreover, in less wealthy, postcommunist, and (in the case of trust) less equal countries, the effect of classroom average socioeconomic background on country-related trust and participation was even negative.
Together with the abovementioned finding that country-related participation was slightly higher in less equal countries, the tendency of students from classrooms with lower average socioeconomic background to participate more in their communities might indicate that country-related participation in the wider community often addresses the grievances and everyday problems in one's surroundings. Such motivations are probably not common for the participation at the European level that has rather positive associations with socioeconomic conditions.
Limitations
Three limitations of this study should be mentioned. First, our analysis intentionally focuses only on two components of active citizenship. The inclusion of other components, such as national/European identity or participatory intentions, could bring further details on studied predictors. Second, the data is cross-sectional, hence causal interpretations should be made only with caution. Finally, following Bronfenbrenner's (1979) model, some developmental contexts are considered only marginally in the data, specifically adolescents' parents and their attitudes.
Conclusion
Overall, our findings suggest that active European citizenship is different from general active citizenship on the participatory dimension but not on the psychological dimension of trust. Moreover, adolescents' active European citizenship can be boosted if school curricula involve ample opportunities for students' learning about Europe. This also implies that schools, particularly those with large proportions of students from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds, need to be sufficiently resourced to offer opportunities for student exchange with other European countries. Finally, it seems that the gaps in adolescents' active European citizenship can be reduced by decreasing income and other (e.g., educational) inequalities at the country level. Wilkenfeld, B., Lauckhardt, J., & Torney-Purta, J. (2010) . The relation between developmental theory and measures of civic engagement in research on adolescents. In L. Tables   Table 1 . Multilevel linear regression model predicting trust in country-related institutions (n=67,035).
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